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TILL DEATH DO US PART: CHIEF
JUSTICES AND THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
*

TODD C. PEPPERS

CHAD M. OLDFATHER

**

I. INTRODUCTION
The past several years have witnessed an extensive debate over the
prospect of changing the institutional architecture of the Supreme
1
Court. Spurred by, among other things, a dramatic increase in the
* Henry H. and Trudye H. Fowler Associate Professor of Public Affairs, Roanoke
College; Visiting Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
** Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. We thank Paul Carrington
and Alan Morrison for their thoughtful feedback.
1. See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) [hereinafter REFORMING THE COURT]
(collecting essays from a wide range of prominent scholars); Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative
Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511
(2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006); Paul D. Carrington & Roger
C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme
Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009); Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1313 (2007); David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000); Patrick E.
Higginbotham, A Few Thoughts on Judicial Supremacy: A Response to Professors Carrington
& Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 637 (2009); Daniel J. Meador, Reining in the
Superlegislature: A Response to Professors Carrington & Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 657
(2009); Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers
and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006);
Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551 (2006); David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride
Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical
Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 791 (2007); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for
a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: Changing
the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709 (2006); Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Age and Tenure of
the Justices and Productivity of the U.S. Supreme Court: Are Term Limits Necessary?, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 161 (2006); Kevin T. McGuire, Are Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment
of Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, JUDICATURE, July–Aug. 2005, at 8.

710

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:709

2

Justices’ length of tenure, a substantial decrease in the number of cases
3
decided by the Court each term, and perhaps a general sense of
4
dissatisfaction with the Court’s institutional self-conception, the debate
has centered on the possibility of imposing term limits on the Justices.
But there are other possible reforms on the table as well, including most
notably the “Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act of 2009,” which was
5
spearheaded by Professors Roger Cramton and Paul Carrington and
endorsed in whole or in part by at least fifty-four prominent lawyers and
6
law professors. In addition to calling for Congress to create what would
in effect be a term limit for Justices, the Act would create a Certiorari
Division empowered to certify cases for the Court to hear, a term limit
for the Chief Justice, and a mechanism for dealing with Justices who
7
become unable to perform their duties.
2. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 1, at 771 (“We believe the American
constitutional rule granting life tenure to Supreme Court Justices is fundamentally flawed,
resulting now in Justices remaining on the Court for longer periods and to a later age than
ever before in American history.” (footnote omitted)); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C.
Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An Introduction, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra
note 1, at 3, 3 [hereinafter Carrington & Cramton, An Introduction] (“The undisputed factual
predicate [for the symposium that produced the collection of essays in their book] is that
justices today serve much longer than they did throughout our history.”).
3. See Letter from George Alexander et al., to Hon. Joseph B. Biden, Jr., et al., at 13–14
(Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://128.164.132.13/News/20092010Events/Nov09_Conference/Do
cuments/Supreme%20Court%20Proposals%20with%20signatoriesas%20of%2010-6-09.pdf
[hereinafter Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act] (basing its proposal for reform of the
certiorari process on the claim that the Court’s use of discretion to set its docket and thereby
reduce the number of cases it hears “has resulted in a decline in the Supreme Court’s
participation in the basic judicial tasks of judging cases, reconciling conflicts in interpretations
of Congressional legislation in lower courts, and assuring adherence to proper procedures in
mundane criminal cases”).
4. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1549 (noting “the tendency toward ‘posterity worship’
and institutional self-aggrandizement of the current Court”); Carrington & Cramton, An
Introduction, supra note 2, at 5. Carrington and Cramton noted as follows:
Every informed observer, whether of the left, the right or the center, recognizes
that the Court is now an institution exercising extraordinary power. It is not
surprising that justices relish the exercise of the great power the Court now
possesses. The celebrity that now renders sober justices as famous as rock stars, is
flattering, enjoyable, stimulating, and provides many opportunities for travel and
influence.
Carrington & Cramton, An Introduction, supra, at 5.
5. See Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act, supra note 3, at 3.
6. See id. at 2–3.
7. Id. at 5–6, 8, 11, 13–15.
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In this Essay, we identify and explore an additional institutional
difficulty, which bridges these last two components of the proposed Act.
Prior commentary has chronicled the phenomenon of Justices serving
8
beyond the point at which they are able to perform their duties. It has
also addressed the unique powers and responsibilities of the Chief
Justice, with some arguing that the administrative aspects of the role
should be divorced from the effectively life tenure associated with a
9
position on the Court. We wish to highlight a connection. The unique
powers and responsibilities of the center chair may make Chief Justices
even more likely than Associate Justices to take their lifetime
appointments literally, while at the same time increasing the potential
consequences of a Chief Justice’s decision to do so in the face of
physical or mental disability.
Our analysis begins with the case of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, whose final illness is portrayed in detail in a recent book,
Herman J. Obermayer’s Rehnquist: A Personal Portrait of the
10
Distinguished Chief Justice of the United States.
The image that
emerges is of a proud and devoted man who remained dedicated to his
job and the institution of which he was a part. But Obermayer’s
portrayal, considered alongside the press coverage as Rehnquist battled
thyroid cancer, also raises the possibility that a Chief Justice with
declining health might not be aware of or willing to acknowledge the
extent to which his capacity to meet the demands of his job has
diminished. And while that potential exists for any Justice, we contend
that the nature of the Chief Justice’s role creates not only greater cause
for concern, but also an increased likelihood that the dynamic will arise.
The history of Chief Justices at the end of their tenure, which we survey,
is consistent with this thesis. Although the numbers are small (there
have been only seventeen Chief Justices), history suggests that
occupants of the center chair are more likely to remain on the Court
11
until the literal end of their life tenure. Whether a product of the job’s
allure, the lack of anyone with clear responsibility for pressuring a Chief

8. See generally Garrow, supra note 1 (providing a historical overview of mental
decrepitude in the United States Supreme Court).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 137–142.
10. See HERMAN J. OBERMAYER, REHNQUIST: A PERSONAL PORTRAIT OF THE
DISTINGUISHED CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (2009).
11. See infra Part III.
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Justice to resign, or other factors, the phenomenon provides further
support to proposals to modify the nature of the office.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part II recounts
the story of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s final illness, drawing on
Obermayer and press accounts. Part III draws on two distinct bodies of
scholarship—that relating to the illness and disability of Supreme Court
Justices, and that relating to the unique role of the Chief Justice—to
suggest that the concerns associated with disability are more acute in the
case of the Chief Justice. Part III further outlines reform proposals
relating to the office of the Chief Justice, and suggests that our findings
provide additional support to the contention that reform is in order.
The case of the ailing Chief Justice Rehnquist is perhaps the best
example of this much needed reform.
II. THE ILLNESS AND DEATH OF CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
A friend of the late Chief Justice for the last two decades of his life,
Obermayer commenced his book project sparked by his impression that
the news reports and obituaries written after the Chief Justice’s death
12
contained few details about “his personality or his personal life.”
Obermayer absolves the media for failing to report about “Bill
Rehnquist the man,” admitting that the Chief Justice “had worked hard
to keep his private life—including his friendship with me—out of the
13
limelight,” and promises his readers that he will introduce them to the
private and human side of the Chief Justice. Yet in doing so,
Obermayer seeks to achieve more than adding to the store of amusing
anecdotes: “Knowledge about the enthusiasms, biases, foibles and
personal habits of the individuals who affect great events—including
judicial events—contributes, often significantly, to understanding and
14
evaluating them.” Regardless of whether the tales of the late jurist’s
love of cigarettes, books, obscure quotations, small-stakes wagers,
tennis, movies, crossword puzzles, geography, and the Green Bay
Packers shed light on the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy or his voting
record in key constitutional cases, Supreme Court scholars will find a
15
treasure trove of information in Obermayer’s tribute.
For our
12.
13.
14.
15.

OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at ix.
Id. at ix–x.
Id. at x.
Id. at 5, 8–9, 49, 119, 145, 155, 171.
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purposes, Obermayer’s key contribution comes in the form of his
detailing the Chief Justice’s final illness, which in turn provides a new
opportunity to consider why Supreme Court Justices (especially Chief
Justices) decide to take their lifetime appointment so literally.
The story unfolds as follows. On October 22, 2004, Chief Justice
16
Rehnquist checked in to the Bethesda Naval Hospital. Suffering from
a sore throat and a hoarse speaking voice, the Chief Justice believed
that he would be undergoing minor surgery to remove a growth on his
17
thyroid. Three days later, however, the Public Information Office of
the United States Supreme Court announced that the Chief Justice had
been diagnosed with thyroid cancer, had undergone a tracheotomy, and
would be receiving radiation and chemotherapy treatments. The
statement added that the Chief Justice would be back at the Supreme
18
Court for oral arguments scheduled on November 1. Although the
type of thyroid cancer was never officially disclosed, many medical
experts concluded that the Chief Justice had been diagnosed with
inoperable anaplastic thyroid cancer—a rare type of thyroid cancer that
19
is resistant to treatment and often fatal.
The Chief Justice returned to his home in Arlington, Virginia, on
October 29, 2004, and, after failing to return to the Court on November
1 as promised, issued a statement that “‘my plan to return to the office
20
today was too optimistic.’” The Chief Justice reassured the public that
he remained committed to carrying out his judicial responsibilities:
“‘While at home, I am working on court matters, including opinions for
cases already argued. I am, and will continue to be, in close contact with
my colleagues, my law clerks, and members of the Supreme Court
21
staff.’” Chief Justice Rehnquist’s promise to remain fully engaged in
the business of the Court was further evidenced by the news that he
16. Linda Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Rehnquist Treated for Thyroid Cancer,
Supreme Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A1.
17. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 215.
18. Greenhouse & Seelye, supra note 16.
19. See Lawrence K. Altman, Extended Absence of Chief Justice Hints at More Serious
Cancer than He First Indicated, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A25; Lawrence K. Altman,
Prognosis for Rehnquist Depends on Which Type of Thyroid Cancer He Has, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2004, at A16.
20. Linda Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Rehnquist Fails to Return, and
Speculation Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1 (quoting directly a statement made by
the Chief Justice).
21. Id. (quoting directly a statement made by the Chief Justice).
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continued to review certiorari petitions and to participate in cases
scheduled for oral argument by reviewing hearing transcripts and case
22
briefs. Despite these reassurances, discussion of retirement and the
selection of a possible successor preoccupied the media in the
23
subsequent weeks. The media also raised the question of how the
Court should deal with the situation if Rehnquist were unable to
24
perform his duties but refused to resign.
Although the aforementioned press releases gave the impression
that the Chief Justice’s daily life remained relatively unaltered by his
illness, Obermayer reveals that the Chief Justice was far weaker than
the public realized. Obermayer writes,
Following his surgery, Bill was too weak to climb the eight
steps leading to his front door, so he lived in the basement of his
Arlington townhouse. . . . [H]e never again sat at his dining
room table, slept in his own bed, ate meals prepared in his
kitchen or entertained family and friends in his tastefully
decorated living room.
Only in this arrangement could he continue to live in his own
25
home.
The Chief Justice, however, was more than merely weak. “He could
no longer sustain himself. He needed health care professionals nearby
26
at all times.” In the weeks following his surgery, the Chief Justice had
a tracheotomy tube (to assist with breathing) as well as “additional
tubes and devices protruding from his neck” that made it hard for him
27
to talk on the telephone. Moreover, the Chief Justice was fed through

22. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Won’t Return to the Court This Year, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2004, at A11.
23. See, e.g., David Stout, Rehnquist Delays Return to High Court, Raising New
Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/01/politics/campaign
/01cnd-rehn.html (“The announcement, a day before the election, was a fresh reminder that
the next president will in all likelihood have an opportunity to nominate at least one member
of the high court, and perhaps several.”).
24. See Richard Willing & Liz Szabo, Illness a Delicate Issue for Court, USA TODAY,
Nov. 2, 2004, at A3. The first sentence of the article reads, “What if a Supreme Court justice
became too sick to work, but didn’t want to step down?” Id.
25. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 217.
26. Id. at 218.
27. Id. at 219.
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a stomach tube and never able to again eat solid food. “As if he were a
29
baby, care providers fed him at set times each day.” The impact of the
stomach tube quickly became apparent to Obermayer:
From top to bottom, his weight loss became apparent. His
face became gaunt and jowly. The skin below his chin, on either
side of the tracheotomy tube, hung like a rooster’s wattles. He
moved his belt buckle in a notch every few weeks. When the
waist in a pair of trousers is four to five inches too wide, their ill
fit tells a story in loud and clear tones. He was wasting away—
30
rapidly.
As the Chief Justice slowly recovered from his surgery and
underwent radiation and chemotherapy treatments, he struggled to
maintain an active work schedule. Nonetheless, he was unable to
perform all of his duties, electing not to vote in all the cases that had
been argued before the Court, but rather to participate only when
31
necessary to break a tie. Observers at the time questioned whether this
32
was a sign that Rehnquist had slipped. Obermayer writes that the
treatments left him feeling “miserable,” and that “he pushed himself to
33
keep up with his job.”
His law clerks, secretary and chief of staff came to his
townhouse basement on a regular basis. They reviewed with
him transcripts, briefs[,] . . . court management questions[,] and
his colleagues’ positions and opinions. Even though he found it
painful to talk or write, he dictated his view on pending cases, as
well as letters and memos related to his job as the federal
judiciary’s CEO. This allowed him to participate in the Court’s
work long before he was well enough to be driven to the
Supreme Court Building and take his proper place at the center

28. Id. at 218.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won’t Vote in Every Case Heard This Term, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A8.
32. Id.
33. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 220.
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34

of the bench.

In Obermayer’s opinion, what drove the Chief Justice in the first
months after his diagnosis was his sense of duty and his love for the job.
He[, the Chief Justice,] approached it with diligence and
gusto as well as affection. While duty was undoubtedly a factor
in forcing himself to work hard[,] . . . probably more important
was the fact that labor on court-related tasks was almost the only
35
thing that brought joy into an otherwise dismal existence.
Because of the Chief Justice’s illness, Obermayer found that their
social interactions were sharply curtailed. While once the two friends
freely visited over the phone and in person, they were now limited to
short visits during the week and watched an hour of football together on
Sunday. During their visits, Obermayer sought ways of accommodating
the Chief Justice’s struggles to talk without pain. When they watched
football, the friends would speak only during commercials so that the
36
Chief Justice “did not have to sustain a lengthy conversation.” And
while the old friends once engaged in lengthy debates, now Obermayer
brought the Chief Justice clippings from such magazines as The
Economist, the National Review, The New Republic, People, and Sports
37
Illustrated. “It was another way of communicating in a manner that did
38
not require him to take part in a lengthy conversation.”
In January of 2005, the Chief Justice finished his radiation
39
treatments but continued with chemotherapy. The Chief Justice told
Obermayer that the thyroid cancer “had been killed,” and he hoped that
the subsequent chemotherapy treatments would reduce the size of the
dead tumor and permit doctors to remove it.
“Much of the
chemotherapy was unpleasant and debilitating, and it required a few

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id.
39. It is unclear whether the Chief Justice underwent radiation and chemotherapy
simultaneously, although a close reading of Obermayer’s book indicates that likely the
treatments were initially taken together, followed by another round of chemotherapy alone.
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overnights in the hospital,” recounts Obermayer.
While the Chief
Justice “talked candidly about the chemo’s side effects,” Obermayer
writes that “he believed that chemotherapy . . . would pay off. I [felt]
certain that he believed his tracheotomy tube would be removed during
the summer and that by October he would be a whole person once
41
again.”
Despite the ravages of his illness and the side effects of the
chemotherapy, in January the Chief Justice slowly resumed some of his
public duties. Reports indicated that he was attending the regular
conferences at the Supreme Court, but he did not attend oral arguments
in either January or February because “the side effects of a tracheotomy
and radiation therapy made it difficult for him to be on the bench for
42
prolonged periods.” On January 20, 2005, the Chief Justice made a
much publicized (but brief) appearance on the steps of the United
States Capitol to swear in President George W. Bush. Writing that it
was impossible to determine whether the Chief Justice’s appearance at
the inauguration “signified a last hurrah or a re-emergence after three
months of intensive treatment for thyroid cancer,” New York Times
reporter Linda Greenhouse stated that the Chief Justice walked with a
cane, was “obviously not in robust health,” and spoke with “a firm if
43
somewhat husky and unfamiliar-sounding voice.” The Chief Justice
was one of the last individuals to arrive on the specially built inaugural
platform, and Greenhouse reported that “[t]here was a slight smile on
his face as he walked down the steps to his seat, whether from
embarrassment at suddenly being the center of attention or from
satisfaction at having accomplished a goal that some had speculated
44
would be out of reach.” The Chief Justice departed immediately after
45
administering the oath.
The Chief Justice finally returned to the Supreme Court bench in
March of 2005, approximately five months after he was diagnosed with

40. Id. at 227.
41. Id.
42. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Will Miss Tuesday Session, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2005, at A12.
43. Linda Greenhouse, Ailing Chief Justice Makes Good His Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2005, at A11.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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thyroid cancer.
Reports varied on the Chief Justice’s appearance.
47
While the Associated Press described the Chief Justice as “frail,”
Greenhouse wrote that the Chief Justice appeared “quite fit” and was
48
“The only noticeable
an active participant during oral argument.
indication of the thyroid cancer for which the [eighty]-year-old [C]hief
[J]ustice has been treated since October was the unfamiliar quality of his
49
voice, by turns reedy and husky,” reported Greenhouse.
On Monday, June 27, the Supreme Court ended its term. Journalists
present at the final session of the Court reported that the Chief Justice
presided over the session with efficiency and humor, but had some
50
trouble speaking. With the end of the Court’s term, the speculation
over the Chief Justice’s possible retirement once again reached a
51
fevered pitch. Reporters and politicians were not the only individuals
awaiting a sign from the Chief Justice. Faced with caring for an ailing
spouse, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wanted to retire, but not if doing
52
so would create multiple vacancies on the Court. Writes Greenhouse:
“Finally, [Justice O’Connor] said, ‘I asked him, and he told me he really
53
wanted to go another year and thought he’d be O.K.’” Based on the
Chief Justice’s decision to postpone his retirement, on July 1, 2005,
54
Justice O’Connor announced that she was leaving the Court.
The unanticipated retirement of Justice O’Connor pulled away the
media spotlight, but not for long. In the weeks that followed the end of
October Term 2004, journalists took up permanent positions outside of

46. See Charles Lane, Rehnquist Returns to the Bench, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at
A1.
47. Hope Yen, Ailing Rehnquist Returns to Bench After Five Month Absence, SE.
MISSOURIAN, Mar. 22, 2005, at 5A.
48. Linda Greenhouse, After Five Months’ Absence, Rehnquist Is Back in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A20.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Anticipation of a Vacancy, But Silence Says Not Yet, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2005, at A16.
51. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman & Linda Greenhouse, Suspense Builds and Rumors
Fly as Rehnquist Remains Silent on His Health and Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at A9.
52. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Rehnquist’s Stay on Court Forced O’Connor Out, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2816090&page=1.
53. Linda Greenhouse, News Was Surprising to Colleagues on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2005, at A19.
54. Greenburg, supra note 52; Richard W. Stevenson, O’Connor to Retire, Touching Off
Battle over Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A1.

2011–2012]

TILL DEATH DO US PART

719

the Chief Justice’s home—often yelling questions at the Chief Justice as
55
he left for work. In response to one question shouted by a reporter
regarding his retirement plans, the Chief Justice shot back, “‘[T]hat’s for
56
The media firestorm only
me to know and for you to find out.’”
increased in intensity after the Chief Justice was briefly hospitalized for
a fever, resulting in the Chief Justice releasing a press statement on the
evening of July 14 that was designed to end speculation that Rehnquist
57
would be retiring shortly. “The statement said: ‘I want to put to rest
the speculation and unfounded rumors of my imminent retirement. I
am not about to announce my retirement. I will continue to perform my
58
duties as [C]hief [J]ustice as long as my health permits.’”
It is unknown whether, at the time of his announcement, the Chief
Justice knew that he was losing his battle with cancer. Only two weeks
later, however, Obermayer learned the grim news. During a visit to the
Chief Justice’s home on July 30, the Chief Justice told his long-time
friend that his doctors had “discovered [that] the growth is coming
back” and that he was stopping his chemotherapy treatments because of
59
their ineffectiveness.
“Bill’s matter-of-fact demeanor and terse
60
statements could not hide his disappointment,” writes Obermayer.
61
“He had fought valiantly and painfully. But he had failed.”
On August 4, the Chief Justice returned to a local hospital to be
62
treated for a fever.
According to Greenhouse, there were other
63
hospitalizations during August that were not publicly disclosed. The
end was near. Obermayer paid his last visit to the Chief Justice on
64
August 19.
Only three weeks had passed since he had last seen
Rehnquist, but Obermayer found himself facing a “visibly deteriorated”
man whose voice had weakened and who now relied upon a walker to

55. Linda Greenhouse, Despite Rumors, Rehnquist Has No Plans to Retire Now, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A10.
56. See, e.g., id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 225.
60. Id. at 227.
61. Id.
62. Lawrence K. Altman, Rehnquist Treated for Fever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005, at A11.
63. Greenhouse, supra note 53.
64. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 227.
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65

move across the room. The two men spent a half hour talking about
66
books and politics as well as Obermayer’s upcoming trip to Reykjavik.
As they parted, the Chief Justice reminded Obermayer to send him a
67
postcard. With that, the friends said goodbye for the final time.
The Chief Justice died at home, his family at his side, on September
3, 2005. He had so successfully hidden his terminal diagnosis that his
68
colleagues were shocked by the news. The New York Times reported
that the “[J]ustices indicated that they were as surprised as the rest of
the country to learn late Saturday night that the [C]hief [J]ustice had
69
died.” Retired Justice O’Connor referred to the Chief Justice’s death
as “‘an earthquake for the court,’” while Justice David Souter was
70
“flabbergasted” at the news. “[Justice Souter] said that while Chief
Justice Rehnquist had appeared extremely weak when he returned to
the bench in March after an absence of more than four months—and . . .
wonder[ing] whether he would be able to finish the term—the [C]hief
71
[J]ustice’s health had then appeared to turn around.” Added Souter:
“‘He had an amazing few months and his decision at the end of the term
72
What might have
not to retire had not seemed unreasonable.’”
explained the Justices’ surprise at the Chief Justice’s death was the fact
that he had never talked about his illness or treatment with his fellow
73
Justices.
On September 6, 2005, the late Chief Justice returned to the
Supreme Court for the final time, when his former law clerks carried his
pine casket into the Court’s Great Hall and carefully placed it on the
74
Lincoln Catafalque. His funeral was held the next day at St. Matthew’s
Cathedral in Washington, DC. Eulogies were delivered by President
George W. Bush, long-time friend and fellow Justice Sandra Day

65. Id. at 228.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 229.
68. Greenhouse, supra note 53.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Jan Crawford Greenburg, A Pine Coffin and Tearful Last Respects, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
7, 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-09-07/news/0509070214_1_chief-justice-willia
m-rehnquist-roberts-justices-antonin-scalia.
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O’Connor, and several family members; and then the sixteenth Chief
Justice of the United States was laid to rest in Arlington National
75
Cemetery next to his late wife.
III. WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM THE DEATH OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE?
The final illness of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and his decision to not
retire in the face of a terminal illness, is undoubtedly a poignant story of
an individual who gave his last full measure to an institution that he
loved. There is, however, another dimension. Placed into historical
context, the episode illuminates an additional troubling aspect of
lifetime tenure, namely, the lack of institutional norms regarding when
Chief Justices should release the reins of power.
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution states that all
federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
76
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” In short,
judges can be removed from office only by impeachment. Alexander
Hamilton explained in The Federalist Papers that such judicial
independence is necessary if federal judges are to fulfill the critical role
of protecting the Constitution from overreaching by the other branches
of government and to protect minority rights from the momentary
77
whims of the majority. It has proven to be an effective shield. Since
the ratification of the Constitution, only one Supreme Court Justice has
been impeached: Associate Justice Samuel Chase, who was impeached
by the House of Representatives in March of 1804, but later acquitted
78
by the United States Senate. While House Republicans threatened to
hold impeachment hearings for Associate Justice William O. Douglas
(mainly due to the Justice’s messy personal life), no hearings ever
79
materialized.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 231, 233, 237, 239.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton).
See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15–134
(1992) (providing a historical background of the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase).
79. See Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as Judicial Selection?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 595, 606–07 (2010). As Samahon notes, “congressional surrogates” also threatened
impeachment in the case of Justice Abe Fortas. Id. at 605–06.
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Historically, the primary danger associated with the substantial
independence of the federal judiciary resulting from life tenure is a lack
80
of accountability.
Reduced to its essence, the strong form of this
argument runs that the independence engendered by lifetime tenure in
turn empowers federal courts to substitute their own policy preferences
81
for those of duly-elected legislators.
82
Yet, as developed in the debates referenced above, lifetime tenure
also raises concerns about the competence and ability of aging jurists.
Indeed, the history of the United States Supreme Court is filled with
examples of Justices who remained on the bench as their physical health
83
deteriorated and their mental acuity declined. These concerns about
judicial competency should be greater when it comes to Chief Justices.
The Chief Justice bears a host of responsibilities beyond those of an
Associate Justice, which increases the potential consequences of an
inability to serve. What is more, when compared to Associate Justices,
Chief Justices show even a greater reluctance to leave the Supreme
Court.
Political scientist David N. Atkinson has documented Supreme
Court Justices “at the end,” and his accounts offer an important warning
84
that lifetime tenure comes with the additional cost of judicial infirmity.
Moreover, a close examination of the history suggests that the dangers
of infirmity are more likely to arise with respect to Chief Justices.
According to Atkinson’s research, only four of the last sixteen Chief
Justices have retired from the Supreme Court while in good health: John

80. Professor Saikrishna Prakash makes the point quite colorfully:
Professors might be thought part of a conspiracy of silence regarding life tenure.
We favor life tenure so much for ourselves that we are unwilling to confront its
drawbacks for judges. Indeed, no one should doubt that the conventional wisdom
regarding life tenure is quite strong. In rather bulky and recent law reviews
dedicated to ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability,’ no academic seriously
questioned whether life tenure serves any purpose. Instead, most assumed the
value of life tenure and noted its tension with accountability.
Saikrishna Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 580 n.171 (1999) (reviewing
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)).
81. Id. at 579.
82. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Garrow, supra note 1.
84. DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE
END (1999).
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Jay (Chief Justice from 1789 to 1795), Charles Evans Hughes (1930 to
85
1941), Earl Warren (1953 to 1969), and Warren Burger (1969 to 1986).
Historically, the norm has been for the Chief Justice to die on the bench.
John Marshall (1801 to 1835), Roger Taney (1836 to 1864), Salmon
Chase (1864 to 1873), Morrison Waite (1874 to 1888), Melville Weston
Fuller (1888 to 1910), Edward Douglass White (1910 to 1921), Harlan
Fiske Stone (1941 to 1946), and Fred Vinson (1946 to 1953) all died
while still holding the position of Chief Justice, while William Howard
Taft (1921 to 1930), who was battling multiple health problems, resigned
shortly before his death and Oliver Ellsworth (1796 to 1800) left the
86
bench while facing a chronic health condition. While the second Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, John Rutledge (1795), was only a recess
appointment, there is evidence to suggest that the Senate voted against
87
confirming him based on concerns about his sanity.
Of the Chief Justices who died while on the bench, only the deaths
88
of Harlan Fiske Stone and Fred Vinson were sudden and unexpected.
The remaining Chief Justices suffered from significant health problems
over a sustained period of time, and their physical decline was known to
Court insiders. Oliver Ellsworth submitted his resignation after
89
developing a painful kidney disorder. The last three years of John
Marshall’s life saw the legendary Chief Justice battle what was likely
90
liver cancer. Shortly before he died, friends described the seventynine-year-old Marshall as “‘very emaciated, feeble [and] dangerously
91
low,’” but alert and clear-headed. Two years before his death, a sickly
Roger Taney had a “premonition of death” and said goodbye to his
92
fellow justices. Still alive one year later, Roger Taney told a friend that
93
he “‘hope[d] to linger along to the next term of the Supreme Court.’”
Linger he did, remaining on the Court until his death on October 12,
1864, at the age of eighty-eight. A stroke rendered Chief Justice Salmon
Chase “barely able to function” during October Terms 1871 and 1872,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 12–13, 113–15, 138–40, 150–52.
Id. at 19–20, 28–31, 39–40, 51–54, 62–63, 79, 89, 96–97, 116–17, 120–21.
Id. at 13–15.
Id. at 116–17, 120.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 39–40.
Id.
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but a colleague noted that Chase’s daughters—including the politically
ambitious Kate Sprague—“‘will never consent to his retiring to private
94
life.’” In a letter written shortly after October Term 1872, Chase wrote
that “‘I am too much of an invalid to be more than a cipher. Sometimes
95
I feel as if I were dead, though alive.’” Chase, who had once served as
Abraham Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary and whose transparent political
ambition resulted in his banishment to the Supreme Court, died two
days later at the age of sixty-five.
A nervous breakdown in 1885 started a downward spiral for Chief
Justice Morrison Waite, and during one of his last appearances on the
bench Attorney General Alexander Garland observed that “‘[i]t was
96
evident to the observer death had almost placed its hand upon him.’”
Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller remained in fairly good health until
October Term 1909, when the diminutive jurist’s own declining health
and the illnesses of other Justices made it difficult for him to carry out
his duties. After his death by heart attack on July 4, 1910, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote that the seventy-seven-year-old “‘Chief died at
just the right moment, for during the last term he had begun to show his
97
age in his administrative work.’”
Less than a week after the Court ended October Term 1921, an
obese, seventy-six-year-old Edward Douglass White died after
undergoing gallbladder surgery—thus fulfilling William Howard Taft’s
98
dream of becoming the next Chief Justice. While Taft had lamented
the fact that the aging and infirm White would never vacate the center
chair, eight years later Taft would be bemoaning his own physical decay.
Describing himself as “‘older and slower and less acute and more
confused,’” Taft wrote to his brother that he “‘must stay on the court in
99
order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control.’” Plagued with
cardiac disease, high blood pressure, insomnia, and anxiety during the
last year of his life, William Howard Taft reluctantly resigned his
position on February 3, 1930—only to die approximately one month

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 96.
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later.
While his successor, Charles Evans Hughes, would leave the
101
Court in good health, Hughes’ successor, Harlan Fiske Stone, suffered
a fatal cerebral hemorrhage while reading an opinion from the Supreme
102
Court bench. The man selected to replace Stone, Fred Vinson, died of
103
a sudden heart attack at the age of sixty-three.
As noted above, the clear historical pattern of dying while holding
the center chair was broken by Earl Warren and Warren Burger, who
both left the Court while in good health. Ironically, it would be an avid
student of Supreme Court history, William Rehnquist, who would reestablish the controversial tradition of Chief Justices holding onto
power after illness had clearly rendered them unable to perform their
duties.
When it comes to the Associate Justices, a slightly different pattern
emerges, and it suggests that they are less likely to continue to serve
despite faltering abilities. In the nineteenth century, the majority of
Associate Justices died in office. But the numbers change dramatically
in the twentieth century, during which only four Associate Justices died
on the bench despite battling significant physical or mental infirmity
(Rufus W. Peckham, Joseph R. Lamar, Benjamin Cardozo, and Robert
104
H. Jackson).
In contrast, a relatively large number of Associate
Justices were forced from the bench due to illness or cognitive decline,
including Horace Gray, Henry Billings Brown, William Moody, William
R. Day, Mahlon Pitney, Joseph McKenna, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Sherman Minton, Harold Burton, Charles Whittaker, Felix Frankfurter,
Hugo Black, John Marshall Harlan II, William O. Douglas, William J.
105
Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall.
In addition, and in further
contrast to the Chief Justices, a substantial number of Associate Justices
have left the bench while in relatively good health. In the twentieth
century, these Justices include George Shiras, John H. Clarke, Willis
Van Devanter, George Sutherland, Louis Brandeis, James C.
McReynolds, Owen J. Roberts, James Byrnes, Stanley Reed, Arthur
Goldberg, Tom Clark, Abe Fortas, Potter Stewart, Lewis Powell, Byron

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 97.
Id. at 113–15.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 77–78, 87–88, 107–11, 121–22.
Id. at 75–76, 80, 92–94, 100, 122–24, 126–33, 146–49, 154–60.
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106

White, and Harry Blackmun. We can now add Sandra Day O’Connor,
David Souter, and John Paul Stevens. All in all, fewer than thirty
percent of the Associate Justices who have served in the twentieth
century have died in office.
Although the numbers involved are too small to permit certain
conclusions, their patterns nonetheless invite consideration of whether
Chief Justices are more likely to die in office than Associate Justices,
and what factors might lead to such a differential. Of course, the
decision to leave the Court is complex. Atkinson suggests that there are
a host of reasons why the Justices hang onto the bitter end:
Supreme Court [J]ustices do not voluntarily leave office for
the following reasons: (1) financial considerations; (2) party or
ideology; (3) a determination to stay; (4) a sense of
indispensability; (5) loss of status; (6) a belief that they can still
do the work; (7) not knowing what else to do; and (8) family
107
pressure to stay in office.
Political scientist Artemus Ward believes that politics primarily
explains the retirement choices of modern Supreme Court Justices.
Ward writes that while Justices’ retirement decisions were once
“primarily concerned with institutional and personal factors” (including
how to survive without a judicial pension, which would explain why so
many Associate Justices died in office in the nineteenth century), that
“generous retirement benefits coupled with a decreasing workload have
108
reduced the departure process to partisan maneuvering.”
This does not explain, however, the tendency for more Chief Justices
to die in office (or remain until illness forces their hand) than retire.
The answer may lie in the unique role and powers of the Chief Justice.
As we explore below, the Chief Justice role has evolved to encompass a
much greater range of responsibilities than possessed by the Associate
109
Justices, which may add to the allure of the job to such an extent that

106. Id. at 75–76, 89, 104–06, 111–12, 115, 117–18, 125, 133, 136, 140–41, 149, 152–54,
160–62.
107. Id. at 7–8 (footnote omitted).
108. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 11–12 (2003).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 122–136.
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its holders are more reluctant to leave. But it may be another aspect of
the Chief Justice role that is primarily responsible for the seeming
differential in the likelihood that Justices will serve beyond their ability
to do so effectively. At various points in history, it has been the Chief
Justice—often with the consensus of the Court—who has approached
110
ailing Justices and suggested retirement. “The [C]hief [J]ustices have
traditionally borne the principle burden of dealing with incapacitated
colleagues, which has all too frequently proved to be trying,” observes
111
Atkinson.
“They have been least successful when a [J]ustice is
reluctant to leave or determined to stay. Although the [C]hief [J]ustice
is primus inter pares, or first among equals, his principal power is that of
112
persuasion.”
Atkinson provides three examples of the Chief Justice’s power of
persuasion at work. He writes that Chief Justice William Howard Taft
felt “great consternation” about Justice Joseph McKenna’s dwindling
mental acuity, and that the poor quality of Justice McKenna’s work
product forced Taft to approach McKenna’s family (and eventually
113
McKenna himself) in hopes of persuading him to resign.
The Chief
Justice, however, did not rely upon tact alone in pushing McKenna off
the Court. The Justices themselves had secretly decided to not decide
any cases in which McKenna was the deciding vote. Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes paid a similar visit to a ninety-year-old Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., but Holmes—unlike McKenna—graciously
114
accepted the gentle nudge.
Approximately fifty years later, Chief
Justice Warren Burger followed Taft’s lead and used a similar tactic,
when he convinced the other Justices (save a protesting Byron White) to
allow him to schedule for re-argument cases in which ailing and
115
confused Justice Douglas cast the deciding vote.
Similar steps were
taken to guarantee that Douglas would not determine on which cases

110. See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 1, at 1018 (noting that once-Chief Justice Hughes
acknowledged his “highly disagreeable duty” to approach Justice Holmes and suggest that he
retire).
111. ATKINSON, supra note 84, at 3.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 93–94.
114. See Garrow, supra note 1, at 1017–18 (noting that “even what may have been the
single most distinguished career in the entire history of the United States Supreme Court
ended in an explicitly requested retirement because of increasing mental decrepitude”).
115. ATKINSON, supra note 84, at 148–49.
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the Court would grant cert.
Consider now Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision to remain in office.
The standard explanations do not apply.
Clearly, partisan
considerations cannot account for his decision: President George W.
Bush had just been reelected to office, and the Chief Justice had several
years in which to retire from the Supreme Court with the assurance that
a Republican President would pick his successor. Given the Chief
Justice’s length of service, he could have retired at full salary—so
monetary considerations cannot explain his behavior. Moreover,
117
Obermayer’s description of his late friend’s love for the Court, and his
118
loneliness at the death of his wife, suggest that Rehnquist enjoyed his
status as Chief Justice and did not relish the notion of retirement.
Finally, the Chief Justice’s own press releases demonstrate that he felt
that he was still capable of performing his duties.
Yet Atkinson’s comments about the role of the Chief Justices in
pushing colleagues to retire suggest another answer—there are no
norms or historical precedent dictating that Associates Justices can, or
should, approach a disabled Chief Justice and urge him to resign.
Granted, the fact that the Chief Justice’s own colleagues did not know
the extent of his illness meant that they did not have the relevant
information necessary to make such an overture. Even if they had,
however, they would have faced several hurdles in doing so. Because
none of them had a formal administrative role, they would have faced a
coordination problem in deciding to act, especially if they did not all
agree that action was warranted. Moreover, even if the Associate
Justices were willing to discuss the Chief Justice’s disability with him,
they lack the institutional levers to give the Chief Justice a necessary
push. Unlike Chief Justices Taft and Burger, the Associate Justices
cannot schedule cases for re-argument or suspend the “rule of four” in
order to divest an ailing Chief Justice of his vote. Without such
institutional norms and powers, the Associate Justices do not have the
wherewithal to make a Chief Justice candidly and objectively assess his
own disability.
For all this, one might still ask whether judicial disability is that
pressing of a concern. To be sure, as Atkinson aptly demonstrates,
116. Id. at 174–75.
117. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 220.
118. Id. at xiii, 169.
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history is filled with examples of disabled Justices. David Garrow has
argued that the problem of “mental decrepitude” occurred more
frequently during the twentieth century than the nineteenth and that it
remains “a persistently recurring problem that merits serious
119
attention.”
Yet, as Ward Farnsworth has observed, the periods of
time in the twentieth century during which Justices worked while
suffering from some degree of mental deterioration constituted at most
two percent of the aggregate service time of all the Justices during that
120
century. Farnsworth further contends that the effects of disability are
mitigated by the presence of the other Justices, as well as by the
presence of a disabled Justice’s law clerks, “who generally can keep a
chambers running without a drop-off in quality remotely commensurate
121
with the [J]ustice’s drop-off in functionality.”
We are inclined to side with those who view mental and physical
deterioration among the Justices as a matter of concern. Even were we
to accept the arguments of those who maintain that the problem is not
significant, however, we believe that the Chief Justice presents a
different case. The reason why we should be concerned about the
variation in retirement rates between the Associate and Chief Justices,
and about the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a Chief
Justice will continue to serve while disabled, has to do with the unique
powers of the center chair.
122
A Chief Justice has dual roles. The first, which is most visible, is
his adjudicative role. In this sense he is, as it is often expressed, “first
123
among equals.” Although he enjoys some enhanced authority relative
to his colleagues on the Court, primarily in the form of his opinion
assignment power, he possesses only a single vote and accordingly can
124
achieve little without the agreement of at least half of his colleagues.
As Theodore Ruger summarizes the matter, “The Chief Justice’s

119. Garrow, supra note 1, at 995; see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 1, at 771–72
(citing Garrow, supra).
120. Ward Farnsworth, The Case for Life Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra
note 1, at 251, 262.
121. Id.
122. See Ruger, supra note 1, at 1551–53 (distinguishing between the adjudicative and
administrative roles of the Chief Justice); Judith Resnik & Theodore Ruger, Op-Ed, One
Robe, Two Hats, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at A13.
123. Ruger, supra note 1, at 1551.
124. Id. at 1551–52.
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adjudicative power is structured and channeled in ways very much like
the other eight Justices on the Court, and, in a more general sense, is
much like the authority of any judge on a multimember appellate
125
tribunal.”
Were this the sole component of his role, then we would
have no greater reason to be concerned about disability of the Chief
126
Justice than of Associate Justices.
It is the Chief Justice’s second role, as an administrator, that
provides greater reason for concern. As is widely appreciated, the Chief
Justice has general administrative responsibility for the Supreme Court
127
itself. That is no small job, for the Court employs over 450 people and
128
But the role
has an annual budget in excess of sixty million dollars.
extends far beyond One First Street to encompass the entire federal
judiciary and a number of committees, commissions, and other related
129
entities.
As Judith Resnik and her colleagues have shown, “the
judiciary functions in many respects like an administrative agency,
seeking to equip itself with the resources needed to provide the
130
service—adjudication—that the Constitution and Congress require.”
As the head of this entity, the Chief Justice is, to outline just a sampling
of his duties, responsible for overseeing the budget of the federal
judiciary, conducting relations between the judiciary and Congress,
appointing judges to some specialized courts, and authorizing requests
131
for lower court judges to sit by designation on other courts.
These powers are considerable. They also require a substantial
investment of a Chief Justice’s time. Indeed, in 1978, Chief Justice
Burger remarked, “‘If the burdens of the office continue to increase as

125. Id. at 1551.
126. Some have indeed suggested that this is the most significant component of the Chief
Justice’s role. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Opting for Change in Supreme Court Selection, and
for the Chief Justice, Too, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 1, at 203, 216 (“In its single
most important aspect, being [C]hief [J]ustice has no significance because the [C]hief, like all
other [J]ustices, has one and only one vote. There are ways in which the [C]hief exercises
more power than his colleagues, but in the most important aspect of the job, he is only the
first among equals.”).
127. See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1588–91.
128. Id. at 1588.
129. See Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States:
More than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 59–62 (1984).
130. Judith Resnik, Democratic Responses to the Breadth of Power of the Chief Justice, in
REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 1, at 181, 190.
131. Id. at 187–93.
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they have in the past years, it may be impossible for the occupant to
132
perform all of the duties well and survive very long.’” Regardless of
whether Burger was right about the capacity of a healthy Chief Justice
to meet the obligations of the role, his comment underscores the
potential significance of even a partial incapacitation. The Chief Justice
does not share his administrative responsibilities. The institutional
structures and mechanisms that might work to mitigate the effects of
133
disability with respect to a Justice’s adjudicative role do not apply.
The Chief Justice as administrator need not persuade four of his
colleagues in order to get his way. Nor must administrative decisions be
explained in written opinions released to the public and subject to
critique. In short, “the administrative powers of the [C]hief [J]ustice are
134
neither officially shared nor constrained by obligations of accounting.”
The Chief Justice differs from most holders of executive power only in
the extraordinary sense that the Chief Justice can, if he chooses, retain
135
his powers for life. If he retains them into a period of disability, there
is a substantial risk that they will be performed poorly, if they are
136
performed at all.
Given the evidence concerning the risks of disability among
Supreme Court Justices generally, coupled with an even greater risk that
Chief Justices will serve beyond their full capacity to do so, reform is in
order. Several varieties have been proposed. These include term
137
limits, the creation of economic incentives to induce a Chief Justice to
138
step down, and restructuring and reducing the administrative powers
139
granted to the Chief Justice. As noted in the Introduction, the Four
Proposals for a Judiciary Act of 2009 would impose a seven-year term
132. Morrison & Stenhouse, supra note 129, at 58 (quoting a transcript of Justice Warren
E. Burger’s Address to the Conference on the Role of the Judiciary in America on December
14, 1978).
133. See Resnik, supra note 130, at 193–94.
134. Id. at 194.
135. Id. Professor Resnik points out that the Chief Justice’s lifetime tenure and “many
grants of power contrast sharply with the authority of other executive officials. Presidents
have term limits. Heads of independent agencies generally do as well.” Id.
136. See Garrow, supra note 1, at 995 (noting that the history of the Court “is replete
with repeated instances” of justices participating in the work of the Court when colleagues
and families of those same justices “had serious doubts about their mental capabilities”).
137. See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1645–46.
138. See id. at 1646–47.
139. See id. at 1647–48; Swaine, supra note 1, at 1711–13.
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140

limit on the office of the Chief Justice.
A separate provision would
expressly impose a duty on all of the Justices “to voluntarily retire when
141
[they are] no longer able fully to perform the duties of the office held.”
In the case of the disability of the Chief Justice, the Act would place a
duty on the Associate Justices to report the disability to the Judicial
Conference of the United States, which would in turn be obligated to
start a process in which the chief judges of the circuit courts of appeals
consider whether there is “substantial evidence” that the Chief Justice
“is not able to perform the duties of the office” and, if they so find, to
“report that finding to the Judiciary Committee of the United States
142
House of Representatives.”
Detailed consideration of the
appropriateness and constitutionality of these proposed reforms is
beyond the scope of our mission in this Essay, and in any event has been
143
extensively debated elsewhere. We seek instead simply to underscore
the point that consideration of reform is necessary in the specific context
of the Chief Justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lifetime tenure comes with several costs. The case of Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist illustrates both a familiar and an overlooked
aspect of those costs. The familiar costs arise out of the phenomenon of
Justices who “linger” after their physical or mental health has failed
them. The overlooked costs are specific to the office of the Chief
Justice. When combined with the fact that the Associate Justices have
neither the formal power nor the support of institutional norms to

140. See Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act, supra note 3, at 11. Section 5 of the
proposed Act provides as follows:
A Chief Justice appointed after the date of this enactment shall be appointed and
may be reappointed by the President with the consent of the Senate for a term of
seven years and an additional time until the next opportunity for the President to
appoint a new Justice arises or until resolution of any pending impeachment over
which the Chief Justice must preside.
Id.
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id. The Act would impose a similar obligation on the Chief Justice to report an
Associate Justice’s disability to the Judicial Conference. But in that case the Chief Justice
would also have an independent obligation to advise the disabled Associate Justice to
retire. Id.
143. See generally, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 1.
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nudge the Chief Justice into retirement, we should not be surprised to
find that almost all Chief Justices die in office—many long after their
physical or mental powers have waned. Whatever one’s view on the
significance of declining performance amongst Associate Justices, the
problem is undoubtedly more acute for Chief Justices. We take no
position here on the question of how best to counter the enduring allure
of the center chair. But we are confident of this: Given the important
role that the Chief Justice plays, not only as the head of the Supreme
Court but as the leader of the federal judiciary, the historical practice of
Chief Justices dying with their proverbial boots on should end.

